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The
heart has many reasons that reason does not understand
[Pascal]
 
Silver
Satamana Bent Bar
Taxila Janapada 600 BC
Introduction
A
fair amount of ground is going to be covered in what follows.
First the manipulation of the precious metals will be examined.
Included is a discussion of Gibson’s Paradox. I would like to
thank Reggie Howe for his gracious approval to reference his work
on the subject, and to Nick Laird for providing the charts.
Next
will follow a look at the presently popular topic of deflation,
inflation, stagflation, and hyperinflation. It seems just about
everyone has a different take on the subject, so one will be
offered that is seldom heard. Included is a difference of opinion
regarding a particular view on the subject.
Please
note that the intent of such discussion is to endeavor to look
into every possible nook and cranny of monetary “theory” in
search of any gems that may have been missed in the ruff, as the
present state of our monetary system is in dire straits and could
use all the help it can get. The eleventh hour has come and gone,
and the clock is fast approaching midnight.
Finally
a look at a somewhat different monetary theory, and its
explanation of hyperinflation will be presented. This “theory”
is not mine, but is being offered because it is the most coherent
and complete monetary theory as of yet put forth by man. It is the
work of professor Antal Fekete.
There
will be a silver and
gold Ariadnean thread running throughout the topics discussed,
readily discernible, revealing not only evidence of their
importance in monetary theory, but also as to their unique role as
the only viable remedy to our present day monetary problems.
The
solution is Honest Money, a system of honest weights and measures
of silver and gold, without any fixing of exchange rates, thereby
allowing the free market to determine the rate of exchange. And
the precious metals should be left as they are, precious and pure,
without fixing an amount of so many dollars to the coin, which
then acts as an albatross about it’s neck, as the ancient
mariner can so attest.
Silver
and gold, if left alone and unfettered, will exhibit their natural
qualities of purity and fineness, as honest weights and measures.
When silver and gold speak – all tongues remain silent.
A
call to return to the monetary system of the Constitution should
be the order of the day, proclaimed by all loyal citizens, to
their elected representatives, whose job, and in several cases
their sworn oath of office, is to uphold and serve the
Constitution.
Some Call It Manipulation
I
would like to thank Reggie Howe and the GoldenSextant
website for providing some of
the following information as duly footnoted where applicable.
Paradoxes
are very interesting critters, as they appear to be absurd,
contradictory, and inconsistent with common every day experience.
Amazing how similar that sounds to a description of the Federal
Reserve System. But enough, on with our tale:
Once
upon a time there was a story named Gibson’s Paradox, which had
a sequel called Gibson's Paradox Revisited: Professor Summers Analyzes Gold Prices.
Prior to becoming our Treasury
Secretary, Mr. Summers was the Nathaniel Ropes professor of
political economy at Harvard. He co-authored the above paper with
Robert Barsky.
It
was, however, Lord Keynes, in one of his more lucid moments, who
coined the term “Gibson's Paradox”, in an attempt to explain
the correlation between interest rates and the general price level
observed during the years of the classical gold standard.
Notice
the similarity of the subject matter with Jackson’s and
Fekete’s linkage theory between interest rates and the price
level, as discussed in part three of Silver IS Money.
The
reason it was a paradox is that Irving Fisher, to whom most things
appeared to be a paradox, suggested that interest rates should
move with the rate of change in prices, i.e., the inflation rate
or expected inflation rate, rather than the price level itself.
Another
one of those inexplicable conundrums. Not so said Summers – I
shall explain, so that all mere mortals may better understand the
arcane workings of the wizardry of finance. The Professor spoke,
as a hushed silence descended upon the audience:
“The
properties of the inverse relative prices of metals today ought to
be similar to the properties of the general price level during the
gold standard years. We focus on the period from 1973 to the
present, after the gold market was sufficiently free from government
pegging operations and from limitations on private trading for
there to be a genuine market price of gold.”
“The
price level under the gold standard behaved in a fashion very
similar to the way the reciprocal of the relative price of gold
evolves today. Data from recent years indicate that changes in
long-term real interest rates are indeed associated with movements
in the relative price of gold in the opposite direction and that
this effect is a dominant feature of gold price fluctuations.”
[courtesy of GoldenSextant]
The
above basically translates into English as meaning that gold
prices move opposite (inverse) to real interest rates – in a
free market that is. Free markets, however, is wishful thinking,
and a bit of a stretch for all but the tallest giraffes in the
jungle. Although free markets are doubtful, the rest of the thesis
remains plausible, at least for awhile.
Nick
Laird at www.sharelynx.net compiled the
following chart expressly for Reggie Howe GoldenSextant to illustrate
the relationship between the price of gold and real long term
interest rates. With both Reggie’s and Nick’s gracious
approval, the chart is presented below. The 30-year U.S. Treasury
bond yield minus the annualized increase in the Consumer Price
Index (calculated as the sum of the monthly CPI increases for the
preceding twelve months) is used to define real long term interest
rates.

Chart Courtesy of GoldenSextant & www.sharelynx.net
The
chart clearly shows that the inverse relationship between long
term interest rates and the price of gold remained fairly intact
until something funny happened around 1995, as the relationship
suddenly diverged in the opposite direction of what it
had been.
Interest
rates and the price of gold are no longer running inverse to one
another, but in the
same direction – and the direction is down.
As
real rates declined from 4% to 2% the price of gold dropped from
$400 an ounce to around $270 an ounce. According to Summers and
Gibson’s Paradox, the price of gold should have moved in the
inverse direction – or up in price. So what happened? Did
one of the four horsemen suddenly appear?
The Fix
One
possible explanation that Mr. Summers provides in his paper is
what he refers to as “government pegging operations”.
Hmm, I wonder if that is the same as government intervention in
the markets? Or perhaps it is as innocuous as trying to force a
square peg into a round hole for a psychological job evaluation
test, job related of course.
A
search for further evidence that might shed some light on the
shadows seems to be appropriate. Recall in part three of Silver IS Money
that some important definitions of critical terms from the
Nymex were listed. One of them stated:
Swap
A
custom-tailored, individually negotiated transaction designed to
manage financial risk, usually over a period of one to 12 years.
Swaps can be conducted directly by two counterparties, or through
a third party such as a bank or brokerage house. The writer of the
swap, such as a bank or brokerage house, may elect to assume the
risk itself, or manage its own market exposure on an exchange.
Swap
transactions include interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and
price swaps for commodities, including energy and metals. In a
typical commodity or price swap, parties exchange payments based
on changes in the price of a commodity or a market index, while
fixing the price they effectively pay for the physical commodity.
The transaction enables each party to manage exposure to commodity
prices or index values. Settlements are usually made in cash.
What Did They Say?
From
the transcript of the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee
on March 26, 1991 the following “exchange” took place between
Federal Reserve Governor Wayne Angell and Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan.
Chairman
Greenspan: "Is there not any mechanism by which we can
create swaps or RPs or something of that nature in which
essentially we have fixed the exchange rate of our holdings?"
Fed
Governor Wayne Angell: “You could have an exchange of puts.
In effect, you could swap puts and thereby assume that somebody
would ultimately want to exercise that added advantage."
Mr.
Greenspan: “Well, the point at issue is that it's a
[forward] exchange transaction that has a date on it. ... And
effectively that gets factored into the market and neutralizes
your position. What I'm thinking of -- and I just thought of it at
this moment, so there might be plenty of reasons why not -- is an
open-ended fixed-price mutual put, to put it in the terms that
Governor Angell stipulated, so that we can eliminate part of the
problem that is on the negative side of the current” -- [sic,
end of paragraph].
Mr.
Angell just prior to the end of the meeting said: “There's
one slight addendum to this discussion: We have a reserve holding
that costs us more money than what is reasonably in prospect to
happen on foreign exchange rates and that is that we really are
not a small reserve holding currency country.
I
think we actually have official reserves of $85 billion, Sam,
compared to Taiwan's $75 billion. And if you mark our gold to the
$358 price, we end up with something like $170 billion. There are
opportunity costs because we don't get interest on that gold as we
do on our foreign exchange [holdings].
That
cost is out there also. I
would hesitate for us to have foreign currency holdings that have
swap puts that just sit there, [which] is now becoming the case
for our gold.”
[quote
courtesy of GoldenSextant]
Did You Catch That?
He
said, "swap puts that just sit there" on
the U.S. gold reserves. Enlightening.
Couple the
above with the Fed's general counsel, J. Virgil Mattingly’s 1995
statement to the FOMC:
“It's
pretty clear that these ESF operations are authorized. I don't
think there is a legal problem in terms of the authority. The
statute [31 U.S.C. s. 5302] is very broadly worded in terms of
words like 'credit' -- it has covered things like the gold
swaps -- and it confers broad authority.” [quote
courtesy of GoldenSextant]
So
the Federal Reserve’s general counsel doesn’t think there is a
legal problem in terms of authority. That’s good to know, such
assurances gives one a warm and fuzzy feeling all over, knowing
the vigilance of those on watch.
I
shudder at the thought of what the consequences would be if the
authority isn’t legal, as that may imply that the keepers of the
temple have no idea what they are doing; or at least no regard as
to the possible ramifications of what they are doing; or perhaps
they are aware of all such issues, but are not concerned with the
consequences of their actions, as they must obey all dictated
policy orders to keep their jobs.
For
some reason, I don’t get the feeling that the keepers of the
temple take helpful criticism all that well. Less than 700 hundred
years ago they used to execute and or sacrifice those who didn’t
agree. But of course that was then and now is now, whatever that
might mean.
Getting Physical
The below
figures show that as of May 13, 2005 there were 6,129, 795 troy
ounces of gold on reserve at the Comex. This is according to the Warehouse Stocks
[click link to view] information section provided by the Nymex at
the referenced website. A summary if offered in the below table.
|
Gold
Warehouse Stocks Troy
Ounce as of close of business: 05/13/2005 |
|
Total
Registered
|
4,203,876
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
4,203,876
|
|
Total
Eligible
|
1,876,398
|
49,821
|
300
|
49,521
|
0
|
1,925,919
|
|
COMBINED
TOTAL
|
6,080,274
|
49,821
|
300
|
49,521
|
0
|
6,129,795
|
Hopefully
I have this all wrong, and either the Nynex or Comex, or perhaps the
reincarnation of Midas can straighten this all out, but something
just doesn’t seem right with the above situation, if it actually
exists, which according to the data would seem to be the case.
Apparently another scintillating example of fractional reserve
policy gone amiss.
The
creatures are stirring – all through the house. While the people
have just settled down, for a long winter’s nap. The master can be
heard mumbling what sounds like a rhyme, something about sage, Rose
Mary and time. But I have perhaps digressed, so back to our tale.
If
there are approximately 6 million ounces of gold on reserve or
deposit at the Comex, this amount would equal approximately 60,000
futures contracts in gold, as each gold futures contract represents
100 ounces.
Suddenly,
from out of the blue, comes forth that rare oddity known as – a
goldbug, and she wants to buy real gold, as in physical gold, not a
paper obligation or promise to deliver that is settled in cash, but
the actual physical delivery of the gold. A rare treat in
deed.
Is There a Limit On the Amount One Can Purchase
Let’s
say this investor has fairly deep pockets, and she wants to
purchase 5000 futures contracts per month for the next 12 months,
and to take delivery on all of the contracts. This would come to
60,000 contracts which, according to the above chart, represents all
of the present gold on reserve at the Comex.
Couple
the above number of contracts and the physical gold it promises to
deliver to this one warrior princess, along with other “regular”
buyers that may also want to take delivery. Suddenly it would seem
that there might be a shortfall of physical gold for delivery, at
least as represented by the presently listed existing reserves.
Not
to mention the difference between the eligible and the registered
categories of the reserves, which could easily make things twice as
messy. But alas, it seems we already have enough of a mess to figure
out, without making things worse.
Considering
that the open interest averages about 250,000 contracts per month,
this figure (5000 contracts) is just a mere pittance in comparison,
representing approximately 2% of the open interest. At least it is a
small pittance when comparing paper to paper. However . . .
Compounding
is a means to very successful investing, one of the best methods
available, but as with all things, compounding has another side to
it, it can also work against one, especially if one is short a
commodity. That old geometric thingy – nothing like a bad case of
inverse compounding to ruin one’s day.
If
the price of gold were to rise significantly, the shorts would be
forced to “cover” or exit their positions by buying into a
rising market price, which would only add fuel to the already raging
fire. This has been explained very astutely by Professor Fekete in
his paper What Gold and Silver
Analysts Overlook.
Fear
can cause that wonderful herd instinct called a stampede to occur
– others call it a short squeeze.
Such
a stampede could short circuit [no pun intended] the system,
bringing down the proverbial house of cards with it – the
destruction of the irredeemable paper fiat currency that goes by the
name of Federal Reserve Notes, the bastardized rendition of the
United States Dollar of the Constitution.
This
is the similar situation that Dave Morgan has written on
regarding silver
in his excellent paper titled Let's Get Physical.
We have used the above example of
gold because it fits in with Gibson’s Paradox. The same holds true
for silver as well, actually the case for silver may even be worse
in regards to reserves.
Not
to worry say those that provide a safe haven to all pirates of the
Caribbean, we know where the secret hoards of silver from ancient
times are stashed. Aye mate, and how much will that cost me and make
for you? Another case of two for them and none for us. Who was that
masked man?
The Fit – Or Is It The Fix
As
noted earlier in the discussion of Gibson’s Paradox, up until 1995
the relationship between gold and real interest rates stayed fairly
consistent. Suddenly in 1995 the relationship diverged in the
opposite direction. The most plausible explanation given by Summers
was “government pegging
operations.”
So
our one time Secretary of the Treasury, former Harvard Nathaniel
Ropes professor, and Harvard University President, states that the
most likely explanation for the breakdown of Gibson’s model is
because of government pegging operations, which sounds an awful lot
like government intervention. To reiterate:
-
Gibson's
Paradox involves the correlation between interest rates and the
general price level
-
The
rate of change in prices is the inflation rate – not the price
level itself
-
Interest
rates should move with the expected inflation rate, rather than
the price level
-
The
general price level is the reciprocal of the price of gold in
terms of goods
-
Reduction
in the real price of gold is equivalent to an increase in the
general price level
-
In
a free market gold prices should move inversely to real
interest rates
-
The
price of gold moves inversely to long-term rates
-
In
1995 the above inverse relation of the price of gold and
interest rates diverged
-
Summer’s
explanation is that of government pegging or market intervention
-
The
breakdown of the inverse relation between gold and interest
rates in 1995 goes against the workings of a free
market according to Summer’s and Barsky’s work
-
Testimony
by treasury officials appears to admit of government
interference in the markets
So
the question of the centuries is before us – does interference by
the government in the markets preclude there being free markets? The
reader is left to decide for themselves, vote accordingly.

Silver Coins
More Evidence
Another
insight on silver manipulation from a Comex floor trader to one of
the foremost silver professionals in the world:
Mr.
Morgan:
I
enjoyed your newsletter excerpt of Feb 12, which I found on the
Kitco website. You stated perfectly some key reasons for
silver's problems in getting out of its own way, and your call for
further weakness was prescient.
I
guess I'm part of the problem. I've traded COMEX futures actively
from the pit for over 15 years. Over the years, the amount of
futures contracts that we've traded has surely dwarfed the actual
physical market, making it difficult for silver to manifest its
true fundamentals.
As
you alluded, it's "Groundhog Day" again on the
floor. Over the past month I watched one fund accumulate an
eye-popping long position, and I followed its progress as best I
could through the open interest and commitment figures. When
prices started slipping away from last week's test of the
$4.85-4.90 level, I could hardly believe my eyes when I saw early
evidence that this fund was starting to sell. I went across the
pit to a trader whom I knew was trying to stick with his longs and
I said, "I've got bad news for you -- that selling you see
over there may take three weeks."
The
fund sold heavily all last week. The usual bank traders were
sopping it up, secretly relieved, I think, that prices had failed
to break into ground they could not control. Younger traders ask
me how these funds can keep getting chopped up like this. They
don't realize that a 30-cent chop in silver is a minor
inconvenience compared to the strong positions most of these guys
have in gold and crude.
As
you know, the banks will continue to play puppet master as
long as the silver game remains "closed." The banks know
the upper parameters of the funds' buying power; the banks know
when the funds have reversed themselves into an untenable short
position. It will take new "players" to get the
"Bill Murray" silver market out of this loop. Certainly
investment demand is the wild card that banks and recurrent short
sellers cannot control.
Silver
will be called lower on Tuesday a.m. and, although I'm a bull,
I'll be getting short on the bell. There is no short-term success
in getting in the funds' way.
Thanks
again for your insight -- A Comex Floor Trader
[Courtesy
of www.silver-investor.com.]
And Still More . . .
This
effort [by the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and BIS to turn back
the gold price] was later described by Edward A. J. George, Governor
of the Bank of England and a director of the BIS, to Nicholas J.
Morrell, Chief Executive of Lonmin Plc:
“We
looked into the abyss if the gold price rose further.
A
further rise would have taken down one or several trading houses,
which might have taken down all the rest in their wake.
Therefore
at any price, at any cost, the central banks had to quell the
gold price, manage it.
It
was very difficult to get the gold price under control but we have
now succeeded.” [Governor of the Bank of England]
The
U.S. Fed was very active in getting the gold price down. So was the
U.K. [Howe
vs. Bank for International Settlements et al Gold Price Fixing
Case]. Click link for full brief.
As
Murray Rothbard was fond of saying:
“The
existence of gold in the economy is a constant reminder of the poor
quality of the government paper, and it always poses a threat to
replace the paper as the country's money.”
A Strange Brew
The
sisters three have been hard at work, stirring fortunes cauldron as
it swirls about – the resulting brew still in doubt. Some say
this, some say that; others say either this or that; but could it
even be – this and that. Who can tell the future that lies
ahead, it changes with the forces that cause the breeze to first
blow one way, and then the other, still leaving the way of the other
two brothers.
The
pendulum of creation follows a design, one that no mere mortal can
resign. The best we can do is to go with the flow, to follow the
journey according to its glow – to the end of the beginning and
the beginning of the end – the alpha and omega of the point and
the circle.
What
path is our monetary system going to traverse? Is it just going to
muddle along, or might it implode? Does it choose to stagnate, or
will it explode? Will we experience deflation or inflation, and are
there other less desirable choices lurking about, known by the name
of hyperinflation? Which of the four horsemen are going to appear?
These
are tough questions, the answers to which, no one knows with any
certainty – the future is not ours to predict. All we can do is to
keep a watchful eye, ever vigilante on the distant horizon, as it is
from that direction that the perfect storm will approach, making
known the meaning of the words – behold a pale horse.
Gold and Deflation
Recently
there has been a plethora of opinions on not only the deflation or
inflation debate, but also on the issue of how gold and or silver
will fare during certain episodes of the “flations”. I have
chosen the following example of one such opinion of the
deflation/inflation debate to discuss, as it contains a good deal of
the most important points on the topic.
The
intent is to simply offer a view not often told, providing the
reader with some additional grist for the mill, to use or not use as
they so choose. It is only by differences of opinion and the
questions engendered that progress can be had. Other comments and
differing opinions are invited.
There
are four issues to be discussed, each represented by a specific
quote. All four quotes are to be offered together to provide a basic
understanding of the issues at hand, then each will be dealt with
individually to allow for more specific and detailed discussion.
“Specifically,
during deflationary episodes of the past gold was the official money
of the land -- gold coins either circulated as currency or the
world’s senior currency was convertible into gold at a fixed rate
-- and, as a result, it represented liquidity. All taxes could be
paid in gold, all debts could be repaid in gold, and almost all
purchases could be made in gold. Under such a monetary system, when
the purchasing power of the national currency rose as a result of
deflation there was a concomitant rise in the purchasing power of
gold.”
“Under
the current monetary system gold is not the official form of money
and therefore does not represent liquidity. In particular, taxes
cannot be paid with gold, debts cannot be paid with gold unless a
special agreement to do so is made between the borrower and the
lender, and more than 99% of purchases cannot be made with gold.
Therefore, in a situation where dollar-denominated obligations were
huge and the supply of dollars was contracting many private
investors would probably be forced to sell their gold in order to
obtain the dollars needed to meet their financial obligations.”
“The
last remaining official link between gold and the dollar was severed
in 1971 and, not coincidentally, deflation hasn’t occurred since
that time. Unfortunately, this means there aren’t any historical
examples of how gold performs during deflation when the metal is not
the official form of money. However, we can get an idea of what to
expect from gold if deflation were to occur now by a) looking at how
silver performed during the 1930’s, and b) looking at how gold
performed in yen terms during the first half of the 1990’s (the
period following the bursting of Japan’s credit bubble).”
“Before
we re-visit our opinion that a bigger inflation problem is what the
next few years hold in store we will quickly address the idea that
gold, at the present time, is an effective hedge against both
deflation and inflation. This idea violates the laws of logic
because something can’t be itself and simultaneously be something
else. Or, to put it more aptly, it is not possible for something to
be a hedge against one financial outcome and to simultaneously be a
hedge against the opposite outcome. What this means is that if you
are an investor in gold you cannot avoid taking a position on the
inflation/deflation issue. It certainly makes no sense to just buy
gold and assume that you are going to be fine regardless of whether
we get inflation or deflation.” [Gold and Deflation www.speculative-investor.com]
The
following are nine key points of the above stated issue:
-
During
deflationary episodes of the past gold was the official money
-
Gold
coins either circulated as currency or the currency was
convertible into gold at a fixed rate
-
When
the purchasing power of the national currency rose as a result
of deflation there was a concomitant rise in the purchasing
power of gold
-
Under
the current monetary system gold is not the official form of
money
-
If
dollar-denominated obligations are contracting many investors
would be forced to sell their gold to obtain dollars needed to
meet financial obligations
-
The
last link between gold and the dollar was in 1971 and deflation
hasn’t occurred since
-
No
historical examples of how gold performs during deflation when
the metal is not the official form of money
-
By
looking at how silver performed during the 1930’s we can get
an idea of what to expect from gold if deflation were to occur
-
Gold
cannot be an effective hedge against both deflation and
inflation
As
stated earlier, regardless if any of these ideas are correct or
incorrect, it is irrefutable that they offer excellent commentary
and discussion concerning some very crucial issues that need to be
exposed to further enhance public awareness and understanding of a
very complex and critical subject. The future of our children and
their children is at stake. A more detailed discussion of the nine
issues will now be presented.
The Critical Issues
It
is unquestionably true that during all past deflationary episodes in
the United States that gold coins either circulated as currency or
the currency was convertible into gold at a fixed rate.
However,
is this the same as saying that during deflationary episodes of the
past that gold was the official money? I think not. For a detailed
discussion see the full series Honest Money
at FinancialSense Online.
This
is the Keynesian myth that the powers that be have insidiously
ingrained into the minds of the populace to brainwash them into
accepting the unacceptable. Silver and gold coin circulating as the
currency is a far cry from paper money convertible or redeemable at
a fixed rate of silver and gold. The first is day, the second night.
As
has been shown in parts one through three of Silver IS Money
and GOLD: Sovereign of
Sovereigns as
well as well as the Honest Money
series, the original hard money
system of the Constitution called for a silver standard with a
bimetallic coinage system of silver and gold coins.
To
confuse the constitutional hard money system of specie only, with a
system that uses paper money that is only fractionally backed by
silver and gold, and supposedly redeemable in specie, is a grave
mistake of utter folly.
The
debasement of the currency began the first day that paper notes were
issued, irregardless of what was backing it. That was the fateful
day Congress chose not to follow the mandate of the Constitution,
and as is clearly evident, we are now paying the price of that
mistake – as the United States is now the world’s largest debtor
nation. A most unenviable distinction.
Our
monetary policy is on the level of a banana republic. The net
foreign investment position of the U.S. is minus 3
trillion dollars. [-3,000,000,000,000.00] That is equal to 25% of
our yearly gross domestic product. It also indicates that foreign
entities own a good piece of the United States, a piece that is
continually growing larger, similar to that of a cancerous growth.
There
was no mention of paper money in the Constitution, and bills of
credit were specifically disallowed according to In
Article I, Section 8, Clause 2 and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1,
of the Constitution. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 also disallows
the states from issuing anything but gold and silver coin as legal
tender in payment of debts.
Which
brings us to the statement that “when
the purchasing power of the national currency rose as a result of
deflation there was a concomitant rise in the purchasing power of
gold.” This
is confusing the hard money system of silver and gold coin with the
paper currency that was only fractionally backed by silver and gold.
They are two entirely different monetary systems that consequently
function completely different from one another. To think otherwise
is to accept black as white. The tail is being allowed to wag the
dog. Sit boo-boo might be a good start.
The
statement that this “idea violates the laws of logic because
something can’t be itself and simultaneously be something else”
is relevant, but not in the context as presented in the article.
Silver
and gold coin are not the same as the paper money that at times they
have been used to “back”. If they were the same, why would there
have been any need to back one with the other? That which did the
backing – silver and gold coin and or bullion, is far superior to
that which it backed – paper money. Paper money cannot be itself
and simultaneously something else – the silver and gold that
backed it.
The
silver standard defined our unit of money. The dollar was a specific
weight and fineness of silver – the silver dollar. Silver defined
the dollar. The dollar did not define silver. Paper money was backed
by silver. Silver was not backed by paper or anything else, it had
no need to be, it was as good as gold. To consider the
unconstitutional issuance of paper money as the same as silver and
gold coin is to accept the unacceptable. It is saying that black is
white and white is black.
Hence,
the statement that “when the purchasing power of the national
currency rose as a result of deflation there was a concomitant rise
in the purchasing power of gold” is utterly ridiculous when
referring to any paper currency system. Paper fiat money is immoral
and unconstitutional. Any monetary theory based on the acceptance of
such is starting off on the wrong foot and is invalid.
Silver
and gold are not defined by paper dollars or Federal Reserve Notes,
to believe so is to accept a false premise which means all other
postulates based on it, and all syllogisms derived from it, are
false as well.
A
dollar bill or Federal Reserve Note is not the same as
the dollar of the Constitution – the Silver Dollar
And
as a total monetary system, paper money has always been –
irredeemable, even when it was supposedly backed by specie. The most
that paper money was ever backed by specie was 40%, which means that
60% of the paper currency was not redeemable on demand. Also, often
times the backing with specie was suspended for considerable time
periods, and then reduced overtime to 20% and less, to eventually no
backing at all.
This
is the dishonesty of the beast of fractional reserve banking.
It is impossible for such a system to be fully honored.
This
goes to the point of the quality issue of money – its purchasing
power, which in regards to paper money has been debased by 95% of
its original purchasing power – why, because it is not real money,
it is not silver or gold coin. Paper fiat cannot survive the
relentless march of time.
The
final coup d’etat was the issuance by the International Monetary
Fund of the rule that states that no member can have a
currency backed by gold. This is the straw that broke the
back of the Swiss hard money currency. See Ferdinand Lips book: Gold
Wars: The Battle Against Sound Money As Seen From A Swiss
Perspective
The
statement “under the current monetary system gold is not the
official form of money” is true in practice but it is not in
accordance with the Constitution and the Supreme Law of the Land. In
the context that the statement is being made, I accept it as given.
The
same is true of the statement, “the last remaining official link
between gold and the dollar was severed in 1971 and, not
coincidentally, deflation hasn’t occurred since that time”, as
well as the statement that “unfortunately, this means there
aren’t any historical examples of how gold performs during
deflation when the metal is not the official form of money.”
It
is imperative to remember that in 1862, and during the Civil War
that Congress allowed for the first legal tender paper
currency – the greenbacks. Congress kept the greenbacks as
irredeemable currency until the 1870s. Starting in 1913 the Federal
Reserve was allowed to issue its own paper currency – Federal
Reserve Notes. They too were at one time partially redeemable. That
too had a quick demise.
Then
came the infamous New Deal by Roosevelt in
1933. Congress declared Federal Reserve Notes legal tender for all
debts, public and private, and rescinded the requirement that
those notes be redeemable in gold coin.
Then
in 1933 and 1934, Roosevelt, and then Congress, seized
all the gold coin in circulation and nullified all public and
private contracts that called for payment in gold.
So,
by 1934 the paper dollar – the anti-Christ of honest money, had
become the official currency. In 1971 the last tie with gold was
broken, the United States government reneged on their promised
obligations to foreign countries to pay in gold.
This
equated to the United States declaring bankruptcy, as it reneged or
defaulted on its contractual obligations to settle foreign accounts
in gold.
Next
the article states, “however, we can get an idea of what to expect
from gold if deflation were to occur now by a) looking at how silver
performed during the 1930’s.” That’s a bit of a stretch of the
imagination.
Our
original monetary system had silver as the standard, coupled with a
bimetallic system of silver and gold coinage. Silver and gold
originally exchanged at the fixed rate of 15 to 1. It was a mistake
to fix the legal exchange rate of gold and silver.
The
legal definition of the currency can differ from the economic
reality of the market place and the market exchange rate that it
places on the metals. This allows Gresham’s law to play havoc with
the exchange system, first driving away one metal and making the
other dearer and then vice versa.
This
is a perfect example on how one specific point can cause the ruin of
entire system built upon it. The fixing of the rate of exchange
between silver and gold was a mistake and a curse, perhaps
intentional, perhaps not. Regardless, it caused the downfall of the
hard money system. See the Honest
Money series for a detailed
explanation.
To
then use past historical examples of such dishonest and
unconstitutional monetary systems as proof or evidence of how some
economic or monetary theory is now going to explain how silver and
gold will act during deflation or hyperinflation is misguided
folly.
The
first and most important point in trying to explain our present
paper fiat monetary system is to realize and understand that it is
dishonest and unconstitutional, and just what the consequences and
ramifications of such means.
As
previously explained in Honest
Money,
Gold Sovereign of Sovereigns
and the first three parts of Silver
Is Money, first silver was
driven out from circulation and then gold, on several different
occasions during our history.
Eventually
the reputations of both metals became purposefully tarnished,
allowing the silver and gold standards to falter, so that a paper
fiat system could be put in place as the perfect mechanism of wealth
transference.
To
look back at silver’s history to hope to glean a blueprint of how
gold may react in a present day deflation is utter nonsense. Those
whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. Be not deluded
by the jokester of irredeemable paper fiat. As Professor Fekete says
regarding silver:
“Understanding
the Silver Market”
“By
no stretch of the imagination can the silver market be called free
at any time since 1871. In that year two powers demonetized silver:
Germany and the United States. The governments of both were cashing
in on the war-booty from their respective victories. Prussia had
just defeated France, and in the United States the North had just
defeated the South. These governments were dumping silver in order
to raise the gold needed to run a gold standard. The price of silver
fell from $1.29 an oz and continued falling for more than 60 years
to a low of 0.25 ˘, or less than one-fifth of the old official
price (although there was a brief spike back to $1.29 at the end of
World War I) as all other countries with the significant exception
of China followed suit in abandoning silver and turning to gold.”
[Fekete – What Gold and Silver
Analysts Overlook]
In
the meantime the U.S. Treasury was made by law to purchase silver
from the Western states at prices above
market. The silver-purchasing program of the United States remained
in effect for over 75 years, after which the Treasury initiated a
silver-selling program at prices below
market. All in all, 6 billion oz of Treasury silver was sold during
the past fifty or so years and, by now, the U.S. is allegedly out of
silver. [Fekete as above]
Well,
maybe out of silver, but not out of the silver business. Holding the
line on the silver price, or at least yielding ground to higher
prices only gradually, is considered the first line of defense by
the U.S. government protecting the dollar. If silver were allowed to
be cornered, then gold would follow and that would be the end of the
dollar, and the financial domination of the world by the U.S.
government. [Fekete as above]
In
regards to Japan, the same argument of the original definition of
the dollar according to the Constitution applies here as well. Gold
was priced globally in dollars, the upside down apostate definition
of honest constitutional money. Accordingly, it took fewer yen to
buy gold because it took fewer yen to buy the dollars needed to buy
gold. This is nothing more than Keynesian babble or expression of
the dollar-yen exchange rate coupled with the inverse of the
constitutional definition of a dollar.
The
statement that “if dollar-denominated obligations are contracting
many investors would be forced to sell their gold to obtain dollars
needed to meet financial obligations” sounds good, but is it? This
will presently be covered by the explanation of how hyperinflation
occurs, however, there are other points applicable as well.
First,
the entire gold market is a pittance in dollar terms compared to
just one stock the size of Microsoft, etc., let alone all the other
stock holdings of the public in total. To think that there is some
hoard of gold in the publics hands, large enough to pay off the
mountains of existing debt, while the price of gold is falling,
per the above argument of how gold and or silver will fare during
deflation, is incredulous.
Secondly,
the purpose of the Federal Reserve is to create money and credit,
they must inflate or die. As Fed Governor and helicopter pilot
extraordinaire Ben Bernanke stated:
“But
the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or,
today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many
U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the
number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly
threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the value
of a dollar in terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to
raising the prices in dollars of those goods and services. We
conclude that, under a paper-money system, a determined government
can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation.”
[Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke before the National Economists
Club, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2002:
Deflation: Making Sure
"It" Doesn't Happen Here]
Couple
the above statement with the Monetary Act of 1980 Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
that allows the Fed to buy
any asset it so desires at full face value, and you can see how
deflation might have a hard time occurring.
True,
the public cannot issue its own money, and the private sector can
reach a saturation point regarding taking on more debt, but the
government through the Federal Reserve is not encumbered by such
restraints. This is a huge difference of significant importance. But
deflation can still occur – it just isn’t a given absolute as
some seem to believe. Nor is hyperinflation a given. There are very
few givens.
The Fed can print or create more credit and money at will –
Until the primary trend of the market fully expresses that it is a
law unto itself.
If
and when any large companies, hedge funds, or other entities that
the Fed deems are to large to allow to fail, begin to go bankrupt,
the Fed will step in and buy their assets, pay their pension funs,
and fulfill its role as lender of last resort. The government is not
the people. It doesn’t have to apply, nor be approved for more
credit. It can simply create the money and lend the credit to itself
by declaring a national emergency.
This
is how Roosevelt confiscated We The People’s gold. He declared a
national emergency by using The War and Emergency Powers Act [The
Introduction
to Senate Report 93-549].
If you haven’t read the report,
you have no idea of what your missing. Take the time – then vote
accordingly.
Because
there is nothing backing our money, and no labor required to print
it, and no rules restraining such action, the Fed can run the
printing presses at will, not that they use such means, now they
simply make a few clicks on the computer and viola – instant funny
money.
Also
remember, the government at any time, can call in the currency,
demanding that it be exchanged for a new currency, at whatever
exchange rate they decree – like a new one dollar bill for 1000
existing dollar bills. Until...
The
dynamics of the quality or purchasing power of money exerts itself
and the confidence of the people in the paper currency dissolves,
and then:
Behold a pale horse – It goes by the name of hyperinflation
And
as Sir Alan well knows:
“Gold
still represents the ultimate form of payment in the world. It's
interesting that Germany could buy materials during the war only
with gold.” [interesting – quite the understatement]
“In
extremis fiat money is accepted by nobody and gold is always
accepted and is the ultimate means of payment.” [Greenspan]
Hedge Against Deflation And Inflation
Alan
Greenspan is not stupid, as a matter of fact he is quite brilliant,
and an expert on all things monetary. However, somewhere along the
line he chose to become a political animal as opposed to an honest
money proponent, as he was in his early days, as is witnessed by the
paper he wrote in 1964 Gold and Economic Freedom
originally to be included in a
publication of Ayn Rand’s, who referred to the Chairman as “the
undertaker”.
Coupled
with the above quote by Sir Alan you know he knows the truth, but
for whatever his reason – he has chosen not to follow it. Perhaps
he prefers to lead a pale horse, as opposed to accepting to follow
silver and gold – as they are sovereign, not he. Absolute power
corrupts absolutely as Lord Acton said.
“In
the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings
from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of
value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding
illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for
example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver or copper or any
other good, and thereafter declined to accept checks as payment for
goods, bank deposits would lose their purchasing power and
government-created bank credit would be worthless as a claim on
goods. The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there
be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.
This
is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold.
Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the "hidden"
confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious
process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps
this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists'
antagonism toward the gold standard.” [Alan Greenspan – Gold and
Economic Freedom]
According
to the quote by Sir Alan, gold represents the ultimate form of
payment in the world. I would hasten to add – the only true
payment (along with silver). Notice how he uses the words in
extremis, saying that “In extremis fiat money is accepted
by nobody and gold is always accepted and is the ultimate means of
payment.” I wonder what he means by in extremis?
The
dictionary reads that the definition for extremis is “a condition
where two things that are as far as possible from each other”, as
in the “farthest border, edge, end, or point”, to “the
outermost or utmost position”.
Now,
the subject under discussion is money and monetary systems, and the
resulting associated states or conditions that the monetary system
subjects itself to, as in inflation, deflation, stagflation, and
hyperinflation.
The
two farthest or most extreme conditions that a monetary system can
find itself in are: deflation on the one end of credit collapse or
implosion; and hyperinflation on the opposite extreme end of runaway
credit expansion or explosion.
Sir
Alan seems to be implying that silver and gold will work well in
either situation – in extremis as he says. I wonder what makes him
think that? Let’s try and find out.
There
are those that seem to think the opposite, as they say:
“We
will quickly address the idea that gold, at the present time, is an
effective hedge against both deflation and inflation. This idea
violates the laws of logic because something can’t be itself and
simultaneously be something else. Or, to put it more aptly, it is
not possible for something to be a hedge against one financial
outcome and to simultaneously be a hedge against the opposite
outcome.” [www.speculative-investor.com]
We
will save the reader the time and trouble of listening to a missive
on logic, as logic is about as logical as any syllogism’s original
or first premise, which is assumed to be a “given”. Why it is
presumed necessary for something to be itself, and simultaneously be
something else, in order to hedge either deflation and or
hyperinflation, is beyond my understanding. Perhaps a future reply
will provide some enlightenment.
Both
deflation and hyperinflation are in extremis, the
opposite ends of a paper fiat monetary system run amuck. I will
elaborate on how it is possible for something to be a hedge against
one financial outcome and to simultaneously be a hedge against the
opposite outcome, in due course. One of the quoted article’s
footnotes even alludes to part of the explanation when it
says,
“(2)
It's actually more accurate to say that gold is now an effective
hedge against the loss of confidence in fiat currency sometimes
caused by inflation because during those times when the money-supply
growth rate is high but the inflation is not perceived to be a
problem -- during the late-1990s, for example -- gold does not
perform well” [www.speculative-investor.com]
Ah,
a new twist to the game, or is it? In all actuality it isn’t new,
it’s always been one of the main tenets of a paper fiat system –
confidence, as in a game of con–fi–dence. The author is
right on in his observation of this, which is not his twist, but one
of a twisted and distorted system. A twisted sister of sorts.
First
we need to clarify the two beasts we are talking about: deflation
and hyperinflation, and how closely they are related like Siamese
twins – joined at the hip from inception to birth – two sides of
the same sword: same pitch, same slope, same angle; slightly
different cardinal point of direction; same ultimate destination,
yet the means of getting there are different. A non-linear mutation.
Very hard to predict.
Towards A New Theory of Money
The
following new theory of money is not mine. I am simply reviewing the
works of the great minds that have come before, and who contributed
immensely to monetary theory, especially Ludwig von Mises, and
Professor Antal Fekete.
Professor
Fekete is the true father of a new theory of money, which goes
beyond the quantity theory of the past, and takes on the arduous
task of explaining the workings of hyperinflation – the pale horse
whose rider’s name is death. It is upon the foundation that
professor Fekete has built that I attempt to offer a few suggestions
or minor adjustment of the stones already put in place by the master
craftsman.
As
the professor states in The Supply of Oxen at the
Federal Reserve:
“Let's
define inflationary spiral under Kondratiev's long-wave cycle as the
decades-long rise of prices and interest rates, and
deflationary spiral as their similarly long fall. Interest rates may
lead and prices may lag, or the other way round.
The
important thing is linkage. The long-term movements of prices and
interest rates are inevitably linked. Linkage epitomizes a huge
oscillating money-flow back-and-forth between the bond and the
commodity markets.”
So
we are back to Kondratiev’s long wave cycle and the linkage
between prices and interest rates and the flows of money from the
bond to the commodity markets. This is the definition being used for
the inflationary cycle. But what of hyperinflation? Does it march to
the same beat or a different one?
In
his paper Deflation or Runaway
Inflation professor Fekete puts forth ideas
rarely heard and less frequently understood.
-
“The
explanation of the phenomenon of runaway inflation in terms of
linear models is fallacious.”
-
“The
fact is that linear models are useless in studying runaway
inflations. The phenomenon itself is non-linear in nature, as it
is the culmination of a runaway vibration.”
-
“For
this reason explanations of past episodes of runaway inflations
in terms of the quantity theory of money are irrelevant.”
-
“Runaway
inflation is not a monetary phenomenon. It is an interest-rate
phenomenon, more precisely, an economic resonance phenomenon
involving the rate of interest”
-
“The
price level and the rate of interest resonate with the
oscillating money-flows between the bond and the commodity
markets.”
-
“This
economic resonance, under the concerted pounding by speculators,
ultimately reaches the state of runaway vibration.”
-
“When
the fragile confidence in the value of irredeemable currency
snaps, commodities are bought up and all bids for bonds are
withdrawn.”
-
“When
the fragile confidence in the value of irredeemable currency
snaps, commodities are bought up and all bids for bonds are
withdrawn.”
-
“The
linkage may turn the inflation/deflation cycle of Kondratiev
into a runaway vibrator. The ever wider fluctuations in the rate
of interest and price level threaten the entire world economy
with destruction. This is the threat of runaway inflation on
a global scale, something that the world has never before
experienced.” [Fekete - Deflation or Runaway
Inflation]
Professor
Fekete should be honored to have written such a clear and concise
theory of money, including explanations of linkage, and runaway
inflation known as hyperinflation, as well as many other complex
issues, one being his disagreement with Mises that a bank note is a
present good. I agree with professor Fekete in that a bank note is a
future good.
This
is most crucial in understanding money and credit, and will be gone
into in more detail in another article. His mention of the fallacy
of non-linear models is the same as employed in part three of
Silver Is Money,
as well as the recognition that such non-linear events cannot be
predicted.
As
the professor states later on in the same article:
“We
have two scenarios to choose from: global deflation and global
runaway inflation. It is impossible to say which one is uglier,
Scylla or Charbydis. Perhaps it is a mistake to formulate the
problem in terms of these alternatives because, really, there is
only one problem: the debt incubus saddling the world and sapping
the vitality its economy.
Deflation
and runaway inflation are different only in form; they are identical
in substance which is the threat of shaking off the debt incubus.
The former does it by wiping out the value of debt through defaults,
the latter, through debasement. Both threats are wrought with danger
for the world population at large.
It
is not possible to predict which of the two will actually occur. The
only certainty is that the debt incubus will be shaken off by hook
or crook, at the cost of immense economic suffering - unless world
leaders take proper measures in time to fend off the impending
disaster. Luckily, the measure that will fend off one will also fend
off the other. And this measure is the restoration of the gold
standard.” [Fekete - Deflation or Runaway
Inflation]
Once
again Professor Fekete makes a complex subject sound easy, with his
clear and precise explanation. Notice the impossibility of
predicting either deflation or hyperinflation, as they are in
extremis as Sir Alan would say, they are non-linear and hence
susceptible to chaos theory, and the bifurcation point of no return.
See Scylla & Charbydis:
The Scourge of Mankind for a more detailed
explanation.
In
another one of his many works: Quartermasters of
Inflation , the Professor
speaks of the thin line that separates deflation and hyperinflation
saying:
“I
am not predicting that interest rates will keep falling to zero and
that the world economy will succumb to deflation. I just want to
sound the alarm that it might, in view of the counter-productive
monetary policy of central bankers.
Other
scenarios, no less frightening, are also possible. Paradoxically,
the threat of zero-interest (deflation) and that of
infinite-interest (hyperinflation) are separated only by the
knee-jerk reaction of the marginal bond speculator.” [Fekete]
The
knee-jerk reaction that drives the herd instinct to panic and
stampede is the sounding of the death knell of the market, spewing
forth the words:
“And
behold, a Pale Horse, and its rider's name was Death, and Hell
followed him.”
Which Is It?
So
which is it – deflation or runaway inflation that goes by the name
of hyperinflation? Is it possible that one could first occur, and
the other follow thereafter? Yes indeed, as all things are possible,
even chaos in order and order in chaos – the Alpha and the Omega.
So what’s the prediction? Got me, I don’t know.
I
least I’m not alone, and actually in pretty good company. Doug
Noland, Major Uncertainties, www.PrudentBear.com
[April 22, 2005] states:
“I
have never experienced an environment with so many Major
Uncertainties. Is the U.S. Bubble Economy slumping or in the midst
of an intransigent inflationary boom? Are general inflationary
pressures gaining critical mass, or is “deflation” waiting
patiently to make its appearance?”
If
hyperinflation is truly a non-linear event, which I believe it is,
then as chaos theory states, it is impossible to predict such events
with any degree of accuracy. One thing is fairly certain, however,
and that is that deflation does not destroy a currency or e |